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Background and objectives: Paranoia is a common, distressing, and persistent experience that 
can negatively impact on health, wellbeing, and functioning. This study examined the 
immediate and short term (2-weeks) effects of two values-based interventions, versus a non-
values control, on paranoia, as well as the moderating effect of self-esteem.  
Methods: 171 non-clinical adults were randomised to a value-affirmation and goals task 
(VAG: clarifying and reflecting on core values and setting value-based goals) (n = 57), a 
value-affirmation task (VA: clarifying and reflecting on core values without setting value-
based goals) (n = 57), or a non-affirmation control task (NAC) (n = 57). Paranoia was 
assessed at baseline (T1), post-intervention (T2), and two weeks post-intervention (T3). Self-
esteem was measured at baseline.  
Results: VAG participants had significantly lower state paranoia scores at T3 than VA 
(d=.34) and NAC (d=.31) participants. This effect was moderated by trait self-esteem: At 
follow-up, the differential effect of condition on state paranoia was greatest amongst those 
with low self-esteem, with the VAG condition being most beneficial for participants with low 
self-esteem and the VA condition being least beneficial.   
Limitations: Without a goals only control group it is possible that the benefits of VAG over 
VA were attributable to setting and achieving goals. Use of a nonclinical sample limits 
generalisability to clinical groups.   
Conclusions: The findings suggest that focusing on a deeply held value and setting goals in 
line with that value reduced paranoia. This intervention may be most beneficial for 
individuals with low self-esteem.  
 

















Paranoia describes the unfounded belief that another person will, or is currently, 
acting in a way to intentionally cause one harm (Freeman & Garety, 2000). Although 
paranoia is a symptom of many severe mental disorders, r search suggests it is exponentially 
distributed in the general population (Bebbington et al., 2013; Combs, Michael, & Penn, 
2006; Ellett, Lopes, & Chadwick, 2003; Freeman et al., 2005).  This is consistent with 
continuum models that embed paranoia within normal social psychological processes 
(Freeman et al, 2005; Linscott & Van Os, 2010; Strauss, 1969), which is revolutionising 
theory and treatment. In young adult and student populations, paranoia can be more prevalent, 
distressing, and preoccupying than in the general population (Lincoln & Keller, 2008), with 
prevalence rates of 30-40% reported in the literature (Freeman et al., 2005; Peters, Joseph, & 
Garety, 1999). As in clinical groups, paranoia in students is associated with isolation, feelings 
of powerlessness, anxiety, and depression (Ellett et al., 2003; Freeman et al., 2011), and has 
been found to be preoccupying (Ellett et al. 2003; Freeman et al. 2011), persistent (Allen-
Crooks & Ellett 2014), and slow to dissipate once ativ ted (Ellett & Chadwick 2007). 
Paranoia in nonclinical samples can also be a risk factor for developing clinical disorders 
(Poulton et al., 2000; Heriot-Maitland, Knight, & Peters, 2012; Kelleher et al., 2012). These 
findings signify the importance of developing effective, targeted, and process-driven 
interventions are available for individuals experiencing paranoia across the continuum of 
experience.   
Several factors have been implicated in the development and maintenance of paranoia, 
including self-processes (e.g., Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001; 
Udachina, Bentall, Varese, & Rowse, 2017).  Across the continuum of experience, paranoia 















and explicit self-esteem (Combs & Penn, 2004; Ellett et al., 2003; for a review see Kesting & 
Lincoln, 2013), and unstable self-esteem (Thewissen et al., 2007).  In individuals with 
psychosis as well as people in the general population, momentary reductions in self-esteem 
have been shown to predict the onset of paranoia in n turalistic settings (Thewissen, Bentall, 
Lecomte, van Os, & Myin-Germeys, 2008; Thewissen et al., 2011; Kesting, Bredenpohl, 
Klenke, Westermann, & Lincoln, 2013). Manipulating stress in experimental conditions, low 
self-esteem has been associated with heightened paranoi , independent of baseline psychosis 
liability (Jongeneel, Pot-Kolder, Counotte, van de Gaag & Veling, 2018) and social stress has 
been shown to increase non-clinical paranoia due to decreases in self-esteem (Kesting et al., 
2013). These findings suggest that paranoia may be causally triggered by threats to self-
esteem. A small number of studies have reported that self-esteem enhancing interventions can 
reduce paranoia. For example, Hall and Tarrier (2003) piloted a 7-week self-esteem 
intervention in individuals with psychosis, reporting a significant rise in self-esteem and a 
significant reduction in positive and negative psychotic symptoms compared standard care. 
Likewise, Freeman et al. (2014) reported small reductions in negative self-beliefs and 
moderate reductions in paranoia when comparing a 6-week self-esteem based intervention to 
standard care. Effects were not maintained a one month f llow-up, however. In non-clinical 
groups, brief, stand-alone, imagery-based interventions (e.g., compassionate imagery or 
positive self-imagery) have been found to increase self-esteem and reduce paranoia when 
assessed immediately following the intervention (e.g., Bullock, Newman-Taylor & Stopa, 
2016; Newman-Taylor, Kemp, Potter & Au-Yeung, 2017). Together, these findings suggest 
that enhancing self-esteem may reduce the risk of experiencing paranoia, although the 
durability of effects requires further examination. 
Within social psychology research, an extensive literature indicates that the impact of 















personal strength or strongly-held value (Steel, 1988). Such ‘affirmations’ have been shown 
to engage a broader and more positive perspective of the self when under threat (Sherman, 
2013), de-couple the threat from meaningful aspects of he self-concept (Wakslak & Trope, 
2009) and increase openness towards threatening information (Sherman & Cohen, 2002). In 
turn, momentary self-worth is thought to be less contingent on current threat and more stable 
and robust over time (Harris et al., 2018). Affirmations have shown immediate positive 
impacts on a range of outcomes such as health behaviours (e.g., Epton, Harris, Kane, van 
Koningsbruggen, & Sheeran., 2015), stress (Creswell, Welsh, Taylor, Sherman, & Mann, 
2005), and academic achievement (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006) with some 
reporting sustained benefits over several years (e.g., Cohen, Garcia, Purdie-Vaughns, Apfel, 
& Brzustoski, 2009; Sherman et al., 2013). Although it as not been tested, affirmations are 
thought to achieve lasting benefits when they prompt an increase in affirming behaviours 
(Brady et al., 2016; Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). This 
hypothesis is consistent with values-based psychological interventions, such as Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999), where helping individuals to reflect on 
what they most care about in life, i.e., their values, and translating this into achievable, value-
consistent, goals is an integral aspect of therapy. A few studies have investigated the 
independent effects of values tasks within ACT showing, for example, that value clarification, 
reflection, and value-based action can result in significant and lasting (3 month) 
improvements in anxiety and depression, as well as being associated with improved physical 
and psychological functioning in chronic pain patien s (Vowles & McCracken, 2008; Vowles, 
McCracken, & O’Brein, 2011).   
We propose that focusing on core values and setting value-based goals could provide 
a focused, brief, and theory-driven intervention for attenuating non-clinical paranoia. 















receiving negative feedback from others (Schimel, Arndt, Banko, & Cook, 2004), and reduce 
avoidance of others when negative information about the self is revealed to them (Jaremka, 
Bunyan, Collins, & Sherman, 2011). Furthermore, some authors have found that affirmations 
are most beneficial for individuals with low self-est em (e.g., During & Jessop, 2015; 
Haddock & Gebauer, 2011; Lomore, Spencer, & Holmes, 2007; Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 
2001), perhaps because these individuals engage in less spontaneous affirmations than those 
with high self-esteem (Steele et al., 1993) and are less likely to bring to mind personal 
strengths when faced with failure (Dodgson & Wood, 1998). This suggests that those with 
low self-esteem do not engage in affirming processes when faced with difficult experiences 
and that they benefit from being explicitly instructed to do so. Testing the effects of value-
affirmation on paranoia in students, Kingston and Ellett (2014) compared a value-affirmation 
to a non-affirmation control task before exposure to a paranoia inducing laboratory 
environment (failure plus high self-awareness). Affirmed participants had significantly lower 
paranoia scores immediately following the affirmation task and following the paranoia 
induction task. The durability of these effects over time and context was not examined, nor 
was the role of self-esteem.  
This study compared the immediate and short-term (2-week) impact of value-
affirmation plus value-based goals task (VAG) to a standard value-affirmation (VA) and non-
affirmation control task (NAC) on paranoia in a non-clinical sample. Hypothesis 1 predicted 
that the initial effects of VAG and VA on paranoia would be superior to NAC, but that VAG 
would be superior to VA and NAC at two week follow-up. Based on literature demonstrating 
that affirmations are most beneficial for individuals with low self-esteem (reviewed above), 
hypothesis 2 predicted that self-esteem would moderate the effect of group (VAG/VA/NAC) 
on paranoia, such that those with low self-esteem would derive most benefit from VAG, 
















2.1 Participants  
An unselected sample of 171 adult volunteers (74% students; 77% female; 75% white; 
Mage = 25.6, SDage = 8.08) were recruited from the general population hrough advertisements 
posted at the university, on social media, and in the local community and randomly assigned 
to one of two value-affirmation groups (VAG, VA) orthe active control (NA). Sample size 
was calculated a priori. Based on previous research on value-affirmation and paranoia (e.g., 
Kingston & Ellett, 2014), as well as the broader literature on affirmation and goal setting 
interventions (e.g., McQueen & Klein, 2006; Meevissen, Peters, & Alberts, 2011) a minimum 
sample size of 156 was required to detect medium between group effects (two-tailed α of 
0.05 and a (1-β) of 0.80 using a three group between-subjects ANOVA). Of the n=171 
recruited, n=1591 completed the study.  
 
2.2 Self-report measures 
Measures of trait and state paranoia and trait self-esteem were taken at baseline (T1). 
State paranoia was also measured immediately following the affirmation task (T2) and again 
2-weeks later (T3).  
Trait Paranoia was assessed using the Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) at 
baseline (T1). The Paranoia Scale is a 20-item questionnaire designed to estimate trait levels 
of non-clinical paranoid thinking (e.g., Someone has it in for me; I sometimes feel as if I am 
being followed). Items are rated on a five-point Likert scale (1 = not at all applicable to me; 
5 = extremely applicable to me). Total scores range from 20 to 100, with higher scores 
                                                 
1 There was no evidence of systematic attrition as an effect of group allocation and no difference 















indicating higher levels of paranoia. Good internal consistency was shown in the present 
sample (α = .91). Six month test-retest reliability has also been reported as good in a non-
clinical sample (α = .70, Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992).  
State paranoia was measured using the 7-item paranoi  subscale of the Paranoia and 
Depression Scale (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998) at baseline (T1), following the affirmation 
task (T2), and 2-weeks later (T3). Items (e.g., I feel that people are hostile towards me; I do 
not trust other people’s intentions) are rated on a 6-point scale (1 = not at all to 6 = very 
often) with total scores ranging from 7 to42 (higher scores indicating higher state paranoia). 
In this study, as with previous experimental studies (e.g., Kingston & Ellett, 2014), 
participants were instructed to rate the paranoia items based on the timescale of right now. 
Good internal consistency was demonstrated at baseline in the present sample (α = .87), 
which is consistent with previous findings (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998). Non-clinical test-
retest reliability has also been reported as good over a 10-day period (interclass correlation 
coefficient = .75, Kingston, Lassman, Matias, & Ellett, in press).  
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965) was used to measure 
global self-esteem at T1. Ten items (e.g., on the whole, I am satisfied with myself) are rated 
on a four-point Likert scale (0 = strongly disagree to 3 = strongly agree) and total scores 
range from 10 to 40 (high scores indicating high self-esteem). Good internal consistency (α 
= .88) was obtained in the present sample, consistet with previous research (e.g. Vispoel et 
al., 2001).  
 
2.3 Affirmation tasks 
In all conditions, participants began by reading a brief paragraph about values, informed by 















pack of 58 values cards (see Appendix 1)  into one of three categories: ‘very important to me’, 
‘quite important to me’, ‘not important to me’ (Ciarrochi & Bailey, 2008; Harris, 2011; 
Harris, 2013). The conditions then differed in the following ways. 
 
2.3.1 Value-affirmation plus values-based goals condition (VAG).  
Participants in this condition were instructed to atend to those cards in the ‘very 
important to me’ pile and to choose one that was mot important to them. Next, following 
standard value-affirmation procedures (e.g. Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000), participants in 
this condition wrote for up to 10 minutes about their most important value (i.e., describing 
why this was meaningful to them and a time it made them feel good about themselves). 
Participants were then guided to devise a SMART goal (e.g. Harris, 2013) that was in line 
with their most important value and that they would work towards over the subsequent two 
weeks (e.g., Respect: Try to understand people's opinions which aren't the same as mine so 
that I can see their point of view more clearly. Contribution: To start looking into voluntary 
charity work over the next fortnight, specifically those which only require a few hours a 
week). After the two weeks had elapsed, and after completing T3 measures, these participants 
were asked whether they had completed their value-bas d goal (Yes/No). 
 
2.3.2. Value-Affirmation.  
Participants in this group also completed the value affirmation task described for the 
VAG participants, but they did not go on to devise value-based goal.   
 















After completing the card sort, participants in this group were instructed to select their 
least important value and to write about it from the perspective of someone else. This control 
condition is typically used within self-affirmation literature as it control for non-specific 
aspects of the experimental condition (i.e., a ranking task followed by a focused writing task), 
but crucially does not involve reflecting on one’s top values (McQueen & Klein, 2006).  
 
2.4 Manipulation Check 
After completing the value affirmation / non-affirmation writing task, all participants 
rated the following four statements: “This value or personal characteristic has influenced my 
life”; “In general, I try to live up to this value”; “This value is an important part of who I am”; 
“I care about this value” (adapted from Sherman et al., 2000) using the scale 1 = strongly 
disagree to 6 = strongly agree. These items were used as a manipulation check, to verify that 
affirmed participants had written about top values and that non-affirmation participants had 
written about values that were not important to them.  
 
2.5 Procedure 
Following ethical approval, the study was advertised using paper and electronic 
posters, which were distributed at a British University, in the local community, and on social 
media. These described the study as investigating ‘how values relate to our thinking style and 
thoughts about others’. Participants contacted resea ch rs BC and NE to enroll in the study, 
who also carried out data collection procedures. All participants provided written informed 
consent, and then completed baseline measures on a laptop. Participants then opened a 
sequentially numbered sealed envelope containing the affirmation task instructions so that 















provided and by writing about the given value using pen and paper. Participants then 
completed T2 measures on the same laptop. Two-weeks later, participants were emailed a 
link to the final measures, which were completed online (T3). T1 and T2 data were collected 
in a private university campus room, or a similarly suitable location in the local community. 
T3 data were collected via email link. There were no changes to the design after 
commencement of the trial. Undergraduate first year Psychology students received course 
credits for participation and all other participants were entered into a prize draw.  
2.6 Randomization 
Randomization was carried out by an independent resea cher using an online 
randomization service (www.randomization.com). Simple randomization with three 
randomly permuted blocks of balanced ratio (1:1:1) was used to generate a randomization 
key through which sequentially numbered envelopes containing affirmation instructions were 
produced.  
2.7 Data Analysis strategy 
Between-group ANOVA and chi-square analyses were computed to examine 
equivalency of baseline scores and differences werecontrolled for in all subsequent between-
group analyses (Age, see Results 3.1). To examine the ffect of condition on paranoia scores 
overtime (Hypothesis 1) a 3 (Condition: VAG, VA, NAC) X 3 (State paranoia: T1, T2, T3) 
repeated measures ANCOVA was computed, with subsequent post-hoc ANCOVAs 
examining the interaction effect from T1-T2, T2-T3 and T1-T3, followed by independent and 
paired t-tests. To explore whether the act of completing one’s goals influenced the 
effectiveness of VAG on reducing state paranoia, an exploratory 3 (T1, T2 and T3 state 
paranoia) X 2 (goal completion versus non-completion) repeated measures ANOVA was 















Hypothesis 2 predicted that the effect of condition on state paranoia differed as a 
function of baseline self-esteem such that those with low self-esteem would derive most 
benefit from VAG compared with VA and NAC at two-week follow-up. This was tested 
using a 3 (Condition: VAG, VA, NAC) X 3 (State paranoia: T1, T2, T3) repeated measures 
ANCOVA, co-varying for baseline self-esteem. Moderation was tested by examining the 
self-esteem*Condition*Time interaction (i.e., whethr self-esteem moderates the effect of 
condition on state paranoia over time). This was decomposed using Hayes’s (2013) 
PROCESS macro (Model 1) with 5000 bootstrapped samples. Because it was predicted that 
self-esteem would moderate the effect of condition on T3 paranoia, the interaction was 
initially decomposed by examining the self-esteem*condition interaction at each time point 
(whilst controlling for previous time points). For time points showing a significant self-
esteem*condition interaction, the effect of condition on paranoia was examined at low, 
moderate and high levels of self-esteem.   
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptives and Preliminary Analyses  
In the full sample, trait paranoia scores ranged from 20-80 (M = 34.51, median = 31, 
SD = 11.87), state paranoia at baseline ranged from 7-33 (M  = 12.50, median = 11, SD = 
5.34) and trait self-esteem scores ranged from 6-30(M = 19.23, median = 19, SD = 5.04). 
Trait and state paranoia scores were positively skewed. These were corrected using Log10 
and Reciprocal transformations respectively. One-way ANOVAs and chi-square analyses 
indicated between group baseline equivalence on all sociodemographic (gender: 2(4) = 6.17, 
p = .192, ethnicity: 2(8) = 6.23, p = .624) and study variables (trait paranoia: F(2, 168) = 1.58, p 















However, age differed across groups: VA participants were significantly younger (M = 23.74 
years) than those in NAC (M = 27.56 years; t(112) = -2.82, p < 0.01). Age was therefore 
controlled for in all subsequent analyses.  
Manipulation check analyses confirmed that conditions differed in the extent to which 
participants wrote about a meaningful and valued domains (F(2,168) = 261.53, p < .001; VA M 
= 18.88; VAG M = 18.39; NAC M = 9.84). NAC participants scored significantly lower than 
VA (t(72.51) = 17.96,  p < .001) and VAG participants (t(76.99) = 16.65, p < .001), whilst there 
was no significant difference between the two affirmation conditions (t(110.23)  = -1.82, p 
= .071). In the affirmation groups (VA and VAG), a total of 34 values were selected as most 
important, indicating a broad range of valued domains in this sample. Love (n = 11; 19.3%) 
and Trust (n = 9; 15.8%) were most commonly selected as most important. A relatively 
smaller range of values (n = 14) were selected by participants in the NAC condition. Power 
(n = 27; 47.7%) was the most commonly selected least important value.  
3.2 Effect of affirmation group on state paranoia  
Table 1 reports means and standard deviations for state paranoia at T1, T2 and T3. 
The repeated measures ANCOVA revealed a significant Time*Condition interaction (F(4, 152) 
= 2.90, p = .030). Examining the interaction effect from T1-T2, T2-T3 and T1-T3 showed 
that the Time*Condition interaction was significant when comparing T1-T3 scores only (T1-
T3: F(2, 154) = 3.84, p = .024; T1-T2: F(2, 155) = 1.93, p = .149; T2-T3: F(2, 154) = 2.13, p = .122). 
This was decomposed using within and between group post-hoc analyses. Between group 
analyses showed that T3 state paranoia scores were significantly lower in the VAG group as 















group, which did not differ (t(104) = .432, p=.666)
2 . Paired samples t-tests indicated a 
significant reduction in state paranoia scores from T1-T3 for VAG participants only (t(51) = 
3.95, p<.001, d=.58) (VA, t(51) = .838, p=.406, d=.10 and NAC t(53) = .698, p=.488, d=.05).  
[Table 1 here please] 
 
3.3 Effect of goal completion on state paranoia 
Results suggest that adding a goals component to the value-affirmation task accounted 
for the superior effects of VAG as compared to VA alone. To examine whether the act of 
completing one’s goals influenced this, an exploratory post hoc 3 (T1, T2 and T3 state 
paranoia) X 2 (goal completion (N=34) versus non-completion (N=17)) repeated measures 
ANOVA was computed. This revealed a main effect of Time (F(2, 49) = 5.55, p=.005) but the 
Time *Condition interaction was not significant (F(2, 49) = 1.38, p=.256). This suggests that 
there was an overall reduction in state paranoia for VAG participants that was not qualified 
by goal completion.  
 
3.4 Effects of Self-Esteem as a moderator  
The repeated measures ANCOVA revealed a significant Self-
Esteem*Condition*Time interaction (F(4,148)=2.59, p=.037). As predicted, self-esteem 
moderated the effect of condition on state paranoia at T3 (R2 change=.037, F(2, 148)=5.28, 
p=.006), but not at T1 (R2 change=.000, F(2, 161)=.025, p=.975) or T2 (R
2 change=.001, F(2, 
160)=.350, p=.705). These findings suggest that the relationship between trait self-esteem at 
baseline and state paranoia at T3 differed as a function of group allocation (see Figure 1), 
                                                 
















with the difference residing between VAG and VA (t=-3.09, p=.002). For those low in self-
esteem, participation in the VAG condition resulted in significantly lower T3 paranoia scores 
than participation in the VA condition (t=-3.54, p=.001). This was also the case for 
individuals with moderate levels of self-esteem (t=-2.43, p=.016), but not for those with high 
levels of self-esteem (t=-.070, p=.945), suggesting that for those individuals with high self-
esteem, conditions had an equivalent effect on T3 paranoia. For individuals with low self-
esteem, adding the valued-goals component to the values- ffirmation task (i.e., completing 
VAG as compared to VA) resulted in paranoia scores that were an average of 3.65 points 
lower than VA alone. This differential effect of condition on T3 paranoia reduced 
systematically as trait self-esteem increased.  
[Figure 1 here please] 
 
4. Discussion 
This study examined the relative effects of a values reflection task, versus a values 
reflection plus goal setting task and a non-values control task on state paranoia scores both 
immediately following the tasks and at 2-weeks follow up, as well as examining trait self-
esteem as a moderator of intervention effects. The first key finding was that focusing on a 
core value and setting value-based goals (i.e., VAG) was associated with significant 
reductions in state paranoia from baseline to 2-week follow up, whereas focusing on a core 
value without setting a value-based goal was not. This suggests that the act of setting a value-
based goal had a causal role in attenuating state paranoia. Interestingly, exploratory post hoc 
analysis in the VAG group suggested that goal completion did not moderate the effects of 
VAG on T3 state paranoia. Taken together, this suggests that setting a values-based goal, but 
not necessarily completing that goal, accounted for the superior effects of VAG. One 















influential on subsequent paranoia scores than achieving one’s pre-defined goal. Several 
mechanisms may account for this. For example, setting a values-based goal may have 
prompted an increase in value-based behaviour even if the specific goal was not itself 
actuated. Likewise, a felt sense of satisfactory progress towards a goal, but not attainment per 
se, may have driven the benefits observed (see Carver & Scheier, 1990). Another 
interpretation, however, is that goal completion did account for the differences observed, but 
this study did not have sufficient power to detect this. This would be an important area for 
future research. 
The second key finding was that self-esteem moderated the effect of group allocation 
on T3 state paranoia. The differential effect of condition on T3 state paranoia was most 
pronounced for those with low self-esteem. For participants with low self-esteem, reflecting 
on a core value without setting a value-based goal (i.e., VA participants) re ulted in follow-up 
(T3) levels of state paranoia that were 3.65 times greater than low self-esteem participants 
who reflected on a core value and then completed th value-based goals task (i.e., VAG 
participants). In the VAG condition, T3 state paranoi  was low for all participants, regardless 
of their level of trait self-esteem. This suggests that completing the VAG task offset the 
vulnerability towards state paranoia that is otherwise characteristic in individuals with low 
self-esteem. This is consistent with previous research showing the moderating effects of self-
esteem on affirmation interventions, when assessing openness to risk information (During & 
Jessop, 2015) and perceptions of acceptance in close interpersonal relationships (Lomore et 
al., 2007). Overall, the current findings suggest that engaging individuals with low self-
esteem in setting meaningful and valued goals is crucial for achieving improvements in 
paranoia that are durable over a 2-week period. Examining whether the effect of value-based 
goal setting results in longer-term improvements in paranoia would be important to establish 















goals in individuals with higher levels of paranoia (i.e., individuals who experience 
persecutory delusions). 
 Findings should be considered in the light of several limitations. Firstly, we did not 
implement a goals only control group and, as such, it is possible that the superior effects of 
VAG as compared to VA and NAC were attributable to setting, planning and achieving goals 
per se, rather than values-based goals specifically (e.g., MacLeod, Coates & Hetherton, 2008). 
This is an important area for future research. Secondly, participants were predominantly 
white, female, and well educated, which might limit the generalisability of the findings. As 
such, several of the characteristics associated with proneness to paranoia were not 
represented (e.g., ethnic minority groups, males) in this sample. However, low self-esteem is 
a well-recognised vulnerability for experiencing paranoia (e.g., Thewissen et al., 2011) and, 
in this way, the moderation findings are especially useful for the application of this work to 
more vulnerable groups. Thirdly, this study focused on reducing the occurrence of paranoid 
cognitions without examining key indices such as distress, conviction, and impact on daily 
functioning (Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, & Faragher, 1999). Using experience sampling 
and/or virtual reality methodology and assessing distress, conviction, and impact on daily 
functioning would be an interesting avenue for future research.    
Notwithstanding these limitations, the study has a number of important theoretical 
and clinical implications. Firstly, VAG may provide a low intensity intervention for 
attenuating non-clinical paranoia. This is important, given that non-clinical paranoia can be 
distressing, preoccupying (Ellett et al. 2003; Freeman et al. 2011) and persistent (Allen-
Crooks & Ellett 2014; Ellett & Chadwick 2007), as well as being a potential risk factor for 
the development of clinical disorders (e.g. Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012; Kelleher et al., 2012). 
Although ACT has been used as an intervention for pe ple with symptoms of psychosis (e.g., 















values and value-based action on paranoia specifically. Secondly, the data suggest that for 
more vulnerable individuals (i.e., those with low self-esteem) simply reflecting on values, in 
the absence of setting a behavioural goal, may be causally associated with higher levels of 
paranoia. Conversely, when individuals with low self-esteem affirm a value and then set 
value-based goals, their level of subsequent state paranoia was equivalent to high self-esteem 
counterparts. This finding underscores the importance of adding value-based goals for more 
vulnerable individuals. Finally, the findings have broader implications for the use of 
affirmation interventions across a range of social and cognitive applications, suggesting that 
the explicit addition of value-based goal setting may causally enhance the durability of 
affirmation effects. This is an exciting avenue foruture research examining the effects of 
values and value-based goals in clinical and social contexts.  
 In summary, notwithstanding these limitations, the current data show empirically, for 
the first time, that value-affirmation plus value-goal setting is effective in reducing non-
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1. Acceptance: to be open to and accepting of myself, others, life, etc. 
2. Adventure: to be adventurous; to actively seek, create, or explore novel or stimulating 
experiences 
3. Assertiveness: to respectfully stand up for my rights and request what I want 
4. Authenticity: to be authentic, genuine, real; to be true to myself 
5. Beauty: to appreciate, create, nurture or cultivate beauty in myself, others, the environment 
etc. 
6. Caring: to be caring toward myself, others, the environment, etc. 
7. Challenge: to keep challenging myself to grow, learn, improve 
8. Compassion: to act with kindness towards those who are suffering 
9. Connection: to engage fully in whatever I’m doing and be fully present with others 
10. Contribution: to contribute, help, assist, or to make a positive difference to myself or 
others 
11. Conformity: to be respectful and obedient of rules and obligations 
12. Cooperation: to be cooperative and collaborative with others 
13. Courage: to be courageous or brave; to persist in the face of fear, threat, or difficulty 
14. Creativity: to be creative or innovative 
15. Curiosity: to be curious, open-minded, and interested; to explore and discover 
16. Encouragement: to encourage and reward behavior that I value in myself or others 
17. Equality: to treat others as equal to myself and vice versa 
18. Excitement: to seek, create, and engage in activities that are exciting, stimulating or 
thrilling 
19. Fairness: to be fair to myself or others 
20. Fitness: to maintain or improve my fitness to lo k after my physical and mental health 
and wellbeing 
21. Flexibility: to adjust and adapt readily to changing circumstances 
22. Freedom: to live freely; to choose how I live and behave, or help others do likewise 
23. Friendliness: to be friendly, companionable, or agreeable toward others 
24. Forgiveness: to be forgiving toward myself or others 
25. Fun: to be fun loving; to seek, create, and engage in fun-filled activities 
26. Generosity: to be generous, sharing and giving, to myself or others 
27. Gratitude: to be grateful for and appreciative of myself, others, and life 
28. Honesty: to be honest, truthful, and sincere with myself and others 













30. Humility: to be humble or modest; to let my achievements speak for themselves 
31. Industry: to be industrious, hardworking, and de icated 
32. Independence: to be self-supportive, and choose my own way of doing things 
33. Intimacy: to open up, reveal, and share myself, emotionally or physically in my close 
personal relationships 
34. Justice: to uphold justice and fairness 
35. Kindness: to be kind, compassionate, considerate, nurturing, or caring toward myself or 
others 
36. Love: to act lovingly or affectionately toward myself or others 
37. Mindfulness: to be conscious of, open to, and curious about my here-and-now experience 
38. Order: to be orderly and organized 
39. Open-mindedness: to think things through, see things from other’s points of view, and 
weigh evidence fairly. 
40. Patience: to wait calmly for what I want 
41. Persistence: to continue resolutely, despite problems or difficulties. 
42. Pleasure: to create and give pleasure to myself or others 
43. Power: to strongly influence or wield authority over others, e.g. taking charge, leading, 
organizing 
44. Reciprocity: to build relationships in which there is a fair balance of giving and taking 
45. Respect: to be respectful towards myself or others; to be polite, considerate and show 
positive regard 
46. Responsibility: to be responsible and accountable for my actions 
47. Romance: to be romantic; to display and express love or strong affection 
48. Safety: to secure, protect, or ensure safety of myself or others 
49. Self-awareness: to be aware of my own thoughts, feelings and actions 
50. Self-care: to look after my health and wellbeing, and get my needs met 
51. Self-development: to keep growing, advancing or improving in knowledge, skills, 
character, or life experience. 
52. Self-control: to act in accordance with my own ideals 
53. Sensuality: to create, explore and enjoy experiences that stimulate the five senses 
54. Sexuality: to explore or express my sexuality 
55. Skillfulness: to continually practice and improve my skills and apply myself fully when 
using them 





























 Table 1 
State paranoia means (standard deviations) at T1 (baseline), T2 (immediately post-
affirmation task) and T3 (two weeks later).  






Control Group  
T1 State Paranoia  12.28 (4.34) 13.04 (6.75) 12.18 (4.68) 
T2  State Paranoia 11.63 (4.32) 11.98 (6.53) 12.00 (4.35) 

















Figure 1: Interaction between Trait Self-Esteem and Condition (VAG, VA and NAC) on 






































• Focusing on values and setting value-based goals significantly reduced paranoia 
• Focusing on values, without setting goals, did not 
• Self-esteem moderated the effect of condition on paranoia 
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